Does corporate governance really matter for firms performance? Evidence from Italian IPOS market by V. Capizzi et al.
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 9, Issue 1, 2011, Continued - 6 
 
 
569 
DOES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REALLY MATTER FOR 
FIRMS PERFORMANCE? EVIDENCE FROM ITALIAN IPOS 
MARKET 
 
Vincenzo Capizzi*, Renato Giovannini**, Valerio Pesic*** 
 
Abstract 
 
During recent years, corporate governance has received an increasing attention in the academic debate 
due to several scandals in financial world and consequent changes in the regulatory framework. 
Through this paper, we aim to take part in the stimulating debate about the relation between corporate 
governance and performance. Previous literature on this topic provided a solid theoretical framework 
for our research. This paper contributes to this investigation with an analysis of the Italian market, by 
the examination of the relation between the market performance of Italian IPOs and their governance 
structure. In particular, we find evidence of a positive relation between governance, which we 
measured by a new and original governance index made by 40 provisions, and IPOs performance 
occurred in the Italian market during period 1998-2008. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, IPO, Underpricing, Underperformance 
JEL code: G30, G32, G34 
 
*Ph.D., Associate Professor of Banking and Finance, Eastern Piedmont State University, Novara, SDA Bocconi School of 
Management, Milan 
Email: vincenzo.capizzi@unibocconi.it  
**Corresponding Author, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Banking and Finance, G. Marconi University, Rome, SDA Bocconi 
School of Management, Milan  
Email: r.giovannini@unimarconi.it  
***Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Banking and Finance, La Sapienza University, Rome 
Email: valerio.pesic@uniroma1.it  
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
During recent years, corporate governance has 
received an increasing attention in the academic 
debate due to several scandals in financial world and 
consequent changes in the regulatory framework. 
Through this paper, we aim to take part in the 
stimulating debate about the relation between 
corporate governance (CG) and performance. 
Previous literature on this topic, provided a solid 
theoretical framework for our research. The analysis 
by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) is one of the 
various researches on the relation between CG and 
performance. Their analysis is based on the 
construction of a twenty-four-provision index for 
corporate governance; then they matched this index 
against several performance indicators. Similarly to 
Gompers et Al., Brown and Caylor (2004) built a 
governance index including more provisions and 
compared their results with those from Gompers et 
Al. Both studies highlighted the positive impact that 
better governance has over firms‘ performance. This 
paper contributes to this investigation with an analysis 
of the Italian market, by the examination of the 
relation between the market performance of Italian 
IPOs and their governance structure. In particular, we 
find evidence of a positive relation between 
governance, which we measured by a new and 
original governance index made by 40 provisions, and 
IPOs performance occurred in the Italian market 
during period 1998-2008. The paper proceeds as 
follows: Section 2 provides a brief review of previous 
literature on corporate governance. Section 3 contains 
a review of the characteristic of the IPOs market. 
Section 4 describes the methodology used in this 
research, through the rationales used to construct the 
governance index and the description of IPOs 
performance measurement. Section 5 contains the 
results of our analysis, providing evidence of the 
existence of a relation between the governance 
structure and stock performance of Italian IPOs over 
the last decade. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review on Corporate 
Governance 
 
Economic literature has already defined the critical 
role that corporate governance can perform to 
improving the efficiency of the economic system and 
thus contribute to economic growth. For the most 
traditional literature, the issue of corporate 
governance focuses on the key issues arising from the 
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separation between ownership and management 
(Berle, Means, 1932), along with other issues that 
affect the influence that different components of 
governance can determine on business performance 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). Among the multiple 
mechanisms of corporate governance, the board is of 
particular importance. This body helps to mitigate the 
weaknesses of other governance mechanisms, as it 
constitutes a key tool to monitor the behavior of 
firm‘s managers and protect the interests of 
shareholders (Andres and Vallelado, 2008). There are 
several Authors that have investigated over time the 
characteristics of the board, through the assessment of 
various empirical studies that have shown conflicting 
results among them: several studies have analyzed the 
interaction between board size and financial 
performance (Jensen, 2005; Linck, Netter and Yang, 
2008). Others scholars have considered if the 
composition of board between inside and outside 
directors can influence firms‘ performance (Adams 
and Mehran, 2004). A number of recent studies have 
considered if the presence of so-called CEO-duality 
(Brickley, Coles, Jarrell, 1997; Pi and Timm, 1993), 
may have the same effectiveness. Moreover, other 
studies have focused more attention about the 
structure and functioning of board, including the 
assessment of the number of meetings held during a 
year (Mace, 1986; Conger et al., 1998; Vafeas, 1999), 
the presence of committees aimed at ensuring a 
effective managing of the most complex issues that 
characterize banks‘ governance (Klein, 1998; John, 
Senbet, 1998; Davidson, Pilger, Szakmary, 1998; 
Shivdasani, Yermack, 1999). Consistent with the 
studies that have enlarged in the analysis of various 
characteristics of the board and other governance 
characteristics, in this paper we take into account 
various governance provisions, in order to understand 
how these can affect IPOs market performance. 
 
3. The analysis of Italian IPOs 
performance 
 
The listing process represents a big challenge for 
firms willing to become widely traded companies, and 
generally it culminate in an IPO. By this meaning, the 
listing process absorbs many resources and can be a 
high-stress period for entrepreneur; especially young 
firms are subject to market assessment and whims of 
investors. Not surprisingly, shareholders place their 
securities when markets are (over) optimistic and 
liquid.  The literature strongly supports the idea that 
companies are listed taking advantage of favourable 
market condition: Loughran and Ritter (1995) baptise 
these temporary periods ―window of opportunity‖. 
Thus alternate phases of ―hot‖ and ―cold‖ markets 
generates clusters of IPO. The analysis of the time 
series of IPO volumes highlight that it reflects 
favourable market condition (Dalle Vedove, et al., 
2005). According to Lowry (2003) positive market 
momentum attracts additional investors in the market 
and increase the demand for share. Lowry and 
Schwert (2002) in an analysis of US market highlight 
the strong positive relation between a significant 
performance in initial returns and subsequent IPOs 
volume. This generates a lead-lag relation between 
IPO initial returns and subsequent volume of issues. 
Their research also provided evidence of the negative 
correlation between a positive market performance 
and the cancellation of filed issues. As the Italian 
market is mainly composed by smaller firms 
(compared to other international market), ant that 
most of them are family controlled firms, Borsa 
Italiana has invested many efforts to attract new firms 
to the listing, by creating new markets and segments 
and revising corporate governance rules, allowing 
smaller enterprise to list on the market.  
Valuing an IPO is no different from valuing any 
other financial securities. To analyse an IPO is 
possible to use common methods like discounted cash 
flows and comparable firms‘ analysis, but generally, 
limited amount of historical data of firms limits this 
method. The best-known pattern associated with IPO 
is a significant initial return, which means that the 
price at the end of first trading day is significantly 
higher than the offer price (Stoll and Curley, 1970; 
Ibbotson, 1975; Reilly, 1977). Underpricing exists in 
every nation with a stock market, although the amount 
of underpricing varies from country to country. The 
figure 1 contains the graphical evidence of the 
underpricing phenomenon as it occurred in Italy over 
the last decade. The chart highlights how most of the 
firms presented a positive underpricing. The IPO set 
analysed in this research reveal an average initial 
return of 6,24% percent over 158 IPOs in 10 years. It 
also highlights that the 50% of firms registered a 
positive or null underpricing, while only the 23,5% 
registered a negative underpricing. This result is in 
line with Ritter‘s results who calculated it for the US 
securities market finding an average return of 18,8 
percent (Ritter, 2008).  
Another facet of IPO that has been deeply 
reviewed by literature
 
during the last years is the stock 
lower price performance in a period after the offering 
(Asquith, 1983; Agarawal et al., 1992; Loughran and 
Vijh, 1997). Although efficient markets proponents 
would argue that there is no difference between an 
IPO and other stocks after the issue, several studies 
demonstrate the peculiar aspect of IPOs in the long-
run, and confirm the importance of underperformance 
analysis (Ritter, 1991; Loughran and Ritter, 1995; 
Barber and Lyon, 1997). 
 
4. Methodology 
 
4.1. The construction of the Corporate 
Governance Index 
 
The majority of researches in corporate governance 
maintain the existence of a relationship between 
corporate governance and firms‘ performance. In this 
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paper, we develop an analysis of corporate 
governance for Italian IPOs market. This research 
intends to analyse a broad index of corporate 
governance, so it is fundamental to proceed to a 
review previous studies on this topic. An important 
research on corporate governance was developed by 
Gompers et Al. (2003) who analysed an average of 
1500 firms from September 1990 to December 1999. 
Their dataset includes 24 different provisions 
calculated for each company. Although most of these 
provisions are directly related to management‘s 
option to resist to a hostile takeover, such as ―poison 
pills‖, ―golden parachute‖ or more prosaic methods 
such as supermajority to approve mergers, this is one 
of the first researches in this sense. Gompers‘ 
construction of the index is straightforward: for every 
matched provision a firm earns one point. This simple 
scoring scheme, which is adopted, as well, in this 
paper, does not attempt to differentiate between 
provisions, but has the advantage of being transparent 
and easily reproducible. The governance index 
constructed as described above was named G-Index. 
As it is a sum of score for each provision, it varies 
from zero to 24. Their research maintains that firms 
with fewer shareholders right have lower firm 
valuation. Subsequent to the analysis by GIM, other 
authors built similar indexes. Brown and Caylor 
(2004) built a larger index based on 51 provisions, 
and coded the scoring system as Gompers. Their 
research considers 2327 firms with scores that varies 
from zero to 51, but none of the firms scored more 
than 38. Brown and Caylor selected several indicators 
to use as firm performance meter. They selected the 
three operating performance adopted by GIM, the 
Tobin‘s Q as selected by other researchers1 and two 
measures of shareholders payout, dividend yield and 
share repurchases, respectively used by Fenn and 
Liang (2001) and Dittmar (2000). Their research 
highlighted how firms with better corporate 
governance, measured by larger Gov-Score Index, had 
better performance. This means those firms have 
higher return on equity, higher profit margins, are 
more valuable, pay out more cash dividends and 
repurchase more shares from their shareholders. In 
contrast, firms with poorer governance, as measured 
via lower Gov-Scores, have lower returns on equity, 
lower profit margins, are less valuable, pay out less 
cash dividends, and repurchase fewer shares. 
Opposite to these researches is the conclusion argued 
by Core, Guay and Rusticus (2006) whose provides 
an analysis of corporate governance and stock returns. 
In their analysis, they analysed the G-index, as 
proposed by Gompers, against operating performance. 
They choose the return on asset (ROA) as a 
performance indicator. As suggested by Barber and 
Lyon (1997) this is a more powerful measure of 
                                                          
1 Demsetz and Lehn (1985); Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1989); Bebchuck, Cohen and Ferrell (2009); Giovannini 
(2010). 
operating performance. Core et Al (2006) evidence is 
not consistent with a causal relation between 
governance and returns. 
 
4.2. Definition of provisions for corporate 
governance 
 
Starting from the literature review, and considering 
the framework defined above, this paper applied forty 
provisions to newly listed firms on the Italian Stock 
market. The literature review provided above gives an 
idea of how an effective index of corporate 
governance should be constructed, and which are the 
main issues of previous researches. This section 
provides an explanation for each provision and 
identifies previous research on the same topic. This 
gives provision a strong literature support. 
Provisions cover four main areas in firms‘ 
governance, which are: 
 Boards of directors valuation (provisions 1 to 16) 
 Shareholders/creditors protection (provisions 17 
to 24) 
 Remuneration schemes (provisions 25 to 32) 
 Disclosure and internal dealing provision (33 to 
40) 
The provisions definition and literature support: 
1. Board of Directors Size:  Literature2 seems to be 
coherent maintaining that a smaller board of 
directors is more efficient than a larger one. A 
medium size board could be more effective than a 
bigger one this research considers a board 
composed by 6 to 15 members optimal. 
2. Board of directors Composition: The presence 
of independent non-executive directors on the 
board is widely considered as way to protect 
shareholders‘ value as well as other stakeholders. 
Literature
3
 maintains they reduce the agency 
costs associated with the separation of ownership 
and control, through the creation of appropriate 
employment contracts and the subsequent 
monitoring of managerial behaviour. This 
provision assigns a score to those firms in which 
the board is composed by more than 50 percent of 
independent directors.  
3. Board of Directors Annual election: Board 
composition is a representation of shareholders‘ 
majority at the nomination. After that moment, 
any changes in ownership structure modify this 
situation, and may lead to a clash between 
shareholders‘ perspective and board management. 
A new election allows current shareholder to 
choose managers that will drive the firm 
according to their expectations. The Italian law 
establishes the duration of appointment up to 
three years, after which period the board decade. 
                                                          
2 Jensen (1993), Lipton and Lorsch (1992), Yermack 
(1996), Hermalin and Weisbach (2003). 
3 Fama (1980), Fama and Jensen (1983), Kaplan and Reishus 
(1990). 
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In any case ceasing directors could be re-elected. 
The Italian law leaves freedom of movement to 
firms, which could amend these rules. 
Companies, in their statute, can choose a shorter 
term for re-election and establish rules for (re-
)election. In this paper, in accordance with US 
and UK practice, we consider a term of one year 
a good compromise between governance stability 
and the possibility to replace inefficient 
management. This term assure a strong power 
into the hand of shareholders avoiding 
unpunished behaviours. 
4. Board of Directors meeting: The association 
between board meeting frequency and firms‘ 
performance is not a priori clear
4
. In this paper 
the analysis of board of directors meeting 
considers a monthly appointment to be 
reasonable. Analysed firms, in contrast, showed 
that disclosure on foreseen meeting is rare; in 
those cases where a minimum number of 
meetings is expected, it is rather far from what 
this research expects. 
5. CEO’s interests in conflict: Literature maintains 
that a conflict of interest arises when an 
executive, an officeholder or even an 
organization encounters a situation where official 
action or influence has the potential to benefit 
private interest. For what concern CEO conflicts 
of interest the Italian code of corporate 
governance requires to explicitly disclose 
information of possible conflict. In this research 
the focus is on the possible conflicts of interest of 
CEO, which is the main planner and executor of 
corporate strategy. For this reason the absence of 
stated conflicts of interest is a positive aspect for 
firms. 
6. CEO duality: Literature is focusing on the 
debate whether is better to have one person to 
fulfil the CEO position and to be the chairman of 
the board of directors at the same time, rather 
than give the two positions to different people. In 
this paper a separation between the role of CEO 
and chairman is considered a positive aspect. 
7. Lead Independent Director: The New code of 
corporate governance strongly leans toward the 
identification of a lead independent director. The 
new regulatory framework highlights the 
importance that a public company has an 
individual who is an independent director to chair 
the executive sessions of the board. Perhaps the 
most essential tool for establishing independence 
between executives and outside board members is 
the creation of a budget that provides the board 
financial independence. For the reasons 
mentioned above, firms appointing a LID were 
scored a point. 
8. Busy Board: Fich and Shivdasani (2006) in their 
research analysed the busyness of directors. 
                                                          
4 Vafeas (1999). 
Basing on previous literature of reputational 
capital, they argue that the number of boards that 
outside directors sit on is tied to the performance 
of the firms in which these directors are 
incumbents, either as CEOs or as outside 
directors. Basing on the literature research in this 
paper the absence of a busy board is a positive 
characteristic. For this reason, those firm in 
which, on average, directors held less than three 
directorships gained a score. 
9. Disclosure of code for conflicts of interest: 
Literature since many years studies conflicts of 
interest in different fields. Several problems arise 
in those situations in which a conflict of interest 
is recorded. For this reasons, the governance 
regulation promoted by Borsa Italiana maintain 
the importance of a disclosure of conflicts of 
interest code. According to this provision, a firm 
that clearly highlights its behaviour in dealing 
with potentially conflictive operation is desirable. 
When attributing scores in this paper a clearly 
stated code of conduct worth one point. 
10. Internal Dealing Code: Since July 2002, Borsa 
Italiana requires all publicly traded companies in 
the Italian stock market to adopt a self-regulation 
code on insider dealing satisfying some minimum 
requirements. The publicity of internal dealing 
operation concern with allowing general public to 
obtain information on managers‘ perspective. 
11. Managers’ Education: It is easily predictable 
that a higher level of managers‘ education 
increase firms‘ performance. Basing on the 
literature
5
 review in this paper we marked a score 
for those firms in which most of the managers 
held an MBA or equivalent diploma. 
12. Board meeting attendance: This provision 
reflects the idea that a working board is a board 
in which directors attend most of the meeting. In 
this paper, the participation of directors to more 
than 75 percent of meeting is considered a good 
attendance. Although it seem obvious what stated 
above, none of the analysed company clearly 
stated information of directors attendance, neither 
in the Prospectus, nor in annual relations. 
Therefore, in first analysis none of the firms 
scored a point in this provision. 
13. Retirement age: Literature largely debated on 
whether the prevision for a retirement age is 
necessary or not. Proponents of mandatory 
retirement ages maintain that new perspective 
and fresh outlooks are a firm needs, so periodical 
replacement of board directors increase company 
performance. Proposers also argue that directors 
who appointed a board for many years may be 
less independent from management. In addition, 
retirement ages for directors can provide boards 
with a way of getting non-performing directors 
off the board without having to ask for a 
                                                          
5 Roper (1999), Simons and Pelled (1999). 
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director's resignation. Basing on these premises in 
this paper the provision for a mandatory 
retirement age is a positive aspect. As well as the 
previous provision in the analysed firms none of 
them clearly stated a mandatory retirement age. 
Thus, none of them scored a point in this 
provision. 
14. Rules for directors’ shareholding: According to 
Jensen and Warner (1988) and Morck, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (1989), share ownership can be an 
important source of incentives for management 
and boards of directors. Without entering in a 
deep analysis on this paper the presence of a 
regulation for share ownership of directors worth 
one point for firms. 
15. Extraordinary operation by simple majority: 
This provision analyse whether it is possible for 
directors to operate an extraordinary operation 
with a simple majority. This provision is intended 
to monitor the control that the board (as a 
collective organ) has over operation that can 
revolution the whole enterprise. If it is possible to 
buy or sell real estate property, company division, 
business branch, brands, etc with a simple 
majority, this could represent a weak in the 
corporate governance, and could leads to 
insufficient protection for shareholders. In this 
provision, a requirement of a broader majority is 
valued a point 
16. Extraordinary operation by a single director: 
As stated for the previous provision the board of 
directors, which is a collective organ should act 
as such. The possibility for a single director to 
conclude extraordinary operation is a threat for 
the shareholders. In this provision, as well as the 
previous one, where there is a clearly stated 
proxy to operate individually, the firm scored 
zero point; otherwise, where proxies are not 
assigned, the firm scores one point. 
17. Shareholder’s agreement: The shareholders‘ 
agreement involves several aspect of corporate 
governance, depending on the scope it is adopted 
for. On the one hand, it generates a large coalition 
of shareholders, whose virtually act as a single 
shareholder. This modify the relationship 
between the mass of shareholders and the 
directors, reducing the agency cost and allowing 
a more powerful control over directors and top 
executives managers. On the other hand it 
modifies the power relation between 
shareholders, avoiding, or at least limiting the 
participation of smaller shareholders to firm 
governance. This happens because smaller 
shareholders have to face an entity that could 
dispose of more voting rights. In this research, 
the absence of shareholder‘s agreement is 
considered to be positive.  
18. Minorities Directors: For what concern the 
Italian market, in 2005 a reform has amended the 
appointment strategy of Italian listed 
corporations. Concerning the election of the 
corporate boarder, the provisions of the TUF has 
been modified as follows. CONSOB has been 
required to enact a specific regulation on the 
procedures to apply for the election of at least one 
member for the board of directors by minority 
shareholders. This paper emphasizes the 
importance of minority directors, and assigned a 
score to those firms that have one
6
. 
19. Preferred shares with voting rights: A firm‘s 
equity could be allocated trough common and 
preferred stock. In this paper, we consider a 
positive aspect if solely common shares or non-
voting preferred stocks, are issued. In these cases, 
the firm scores one point. 
20. Nomination Committee: According to 
Chtourou, Bédard and Courteau (2001) and Klein 
(1998), the presence of a nomination committee 
is important for board effectiveness and 
monitoring ability because it reviews information 
in order to select candidates for nomination to the 
board. Those firms that identified some directors 
for constituting the nominating committee were 
scored one point. 
21. Nominating Committee (majority 
independent): This provision is strictly related to 
the provision above. It considers whether the 
nominating committee is composed by most 
independent members. This paper maintains that 
a majority of independent members in 
nominating committees increases the governance 
quality. According to current regulation if a firm 
choose to issues a nominating committee it has to 
be composed by most independent directors. For 
this reason in this research, this provision was 
introduced in order to evaluate the composition 
prior to governance code reform. 
22. Nominating committee (entirely independent):  
According to the two previous provisions, this 
one considers whether the nominating committee 
only composed of independent directors. This 
would increase the committee effectiveness, and 
guarantee a wiser choice of board‘s members. 
23. Slate voting: this provision analyse the methods 
used to appoint directors to the board. The 
corporate governance code reform introduced a 
mandatory slate voting system for both majority 
and minority directors.
 
In this research, we 
welcomed the opinion of previous literature
7
 
assigning a score to those firms that implement a 
slate voting system. 
24. Secret ballot: This provision is based on the idea 
that for some decisions the secret ballot could 
generates better results than the disclosed vote. 
                                                          
6 It is important to remember that this paper analysed the 
IPO in the Italian market starting from 1999, so before the 
introduction of the current governance code. So there are 
some firms that do not have a minority director. 
7 Imberti (2008). 
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The key aim is to ensure the shareholders records 
a sincere choice by forestalling attempts to 
influence the voter. For those firms that 
implemented the secret ballot a positive score is 
assigned. It has to be mentioned that the secret 
ballot generates several difficulties in term of 
vote calculation (generally it implies a vote for 
each shareholder rather than a vote for each 
share). 
25. Performance-Linked Incentives: the first 
research about the effect of performance-linked 
incentives against firm‘s performance dates back 
at least to the scientific management studies of 
Taylor (1911).
8
. This research analysed the 
retribution scheme of listed firms, assigning a 
score to those who adopted a performance-linked 
retribution plan This analysis does not take into 
account the achievement of performance 
objectives by managers or directors, it simply 
consider the definition of such scheme. 
26. Remuneration Committee: As stated for 
provision 20, internal committees increase firms‘ 
performance. Literature has encountered a 
growing interest in the remuneration of directors, 
which generated several researches on this 
subject. It is common idea that remuneration 
committee should act as an independent arbiter of 
executive compensation on behalf of 
shareholders. As noted by Williamson (1985) the 
absence of an independent compensation 
committee could raise the suspicion of directors 
writing their own contract with one hand and 
signing it with the other. The presence of the 
remuneration committee is analysed to assign a 
score to firms. 
27. Remuneration Committee (Majority 
independent): As analysed for the Nominating 
committee, as well for this provision, the 
emphasis concern the composition of the 
remuneration committee. As stated in the 
previous point, the Cadbury proposal recommend 
a committee composed most by non-executive 
directors. According to the governance code 
proposed by Borsa Italiana, the committee is 
appointed by a majority of independent directors. 
This provision is intended to analyse whether the 
committee is composed according to previously 
stated requirements, even when those 
requirements were not mandatory. 
28. Remuneration Committee (Entirely 
independent): Although the current regulation 
does not require a committee composed 
exclusively by independent members, in this 
thesis such composition is considered a ―plus‖. 
This provision maintain the idea that a 
remuneration committee completely independent, 
as well as others committee, improve board 
quality. 
                                                          
8 Banker, Lee and Potter (1996), Murphy (1999). 
29. Golden Parachute: In literature a strong debate 
about the effectiveness of golden parachute 
developed in the last decades
9
. In this paper, 
golden parachutes are considered having a 
negative effect on firm performance, so their 
absence is scored a point. 
30. Directors’ length of service: This provision is 
based on the idea that directors serving for more 
than one year in firm‘s management increase 
democracy in board‘s decision. In this paper 
firms gain a score when more than 50 percent of 
their directors maintained their role for at least 
one year. Considering the peculiarity of the 
Italian firms, and, as stated in provision three, 
directors are generally appointed for three years, 
so in this analysis all the firms scored a point. 
31. Directors ownership10: As stated in provision 
fourteen, directors ownership can be an effective 
methods to incentives them
11
. Therefore, 
directors‘ ownership is inversely related to 
agency. At some given levels
12
 of director 
shareholdings, the gains directors can make 
through increasing compensation and perquisites 
probably outweigh the losses in the stock of 
wealth through decreased firm performance. This 
provision analyses whether directors own a 
percentage between 1 percent and 30 percent. 
These limits identify a non-negligible ownership 
share, and allow, as well, the separation between 
ownership and control, which is crucial for listed 
companies.  
32. Shareholders vote for executive remuneration: 
remuneration of top executive is a key for firm 
success. This should follow the performance of 
managers and directors, as stated in provision 26. 
The possibility for shareholders to vote over the 
remuneration scheme is fundamental for 
balancing the ―power‖ between managers and 
owners. This provision analyse whether the vote 
of shareholders is clearly required for executives‘ 
compensation. 
33. Internal Control Committee: This committee 
was introduced with the regulation of 2006 with 
the aim of safeguard the company‘s assets, the 
efficiency and effectiveness of business 
transactions
13
, the reliability of financial 
                                                          
9 Comment and Schwert (1995), Davidson, Pilger and 
Szakmary (1998), Chakraborty (2007). 
10 Jensen and Meckling's (1976), Demsetz and Lehn (1985), 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988). 
11 According to previous researches these incentives are 
effective for both executive and non-executive directors. 
They may be useful for top management in general. 
12 Morck et al. (1988) find that firm performance first rises 
as ownership increases up to 5%, then falls as ownership 
increases up to 25% and then rises at higher ownership 
levels 
13 At least one member of the committee must have an 
adequate experience in accounting and finance, to be 
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information, the compliance with laws and 
regulations. To such purpose, the internal control 
committee is made up of non-executive directors, 
the majority of which are independent. The 
presence of this committee guarantees the respect 
of best practice recommendation, and adequacy 
of internal control. In case such committee is 
present, firms score a point. 
34. Internal Control Committee (majority 
independent): For the internal control 
committee, as well as others committees 
provisions, we analysed whether it is composed 
mainly by independent members. The presence of 
a majority of independent directors in the 
committee guarantees the democracy of 
relationship between large shareholders and 
minorities, performing a deep analysis of internal 
control system. It allows transparency in 
operation. Firms that clearly stated such a 
composition of the committee scored one point. 
35. Internal Control Committee (entirely 
independent): On the base of the scheme used to 
monitor others committees, this provision 
conclude the analysis of the internal control 
mechanism. If the internal control committee is 
composed exclusively by independent members 
this could be considered an effective methods to 
control over internal procedures. For this reasons 
the presence of an independent committee assigns 
a score to those firms that adopted it. 
36. Investor Relator: Borsa Italiana defines the 
investor relator as “the person appointed by a 
listed company to manage relations with 
investors and intermediaries.” In the lasts few 
years, a culture of greater corporate transparency 
is becoming increasingly widespread The 
investor relator plays a role of ―trait d‘union‖ 
between company top managements and the 
professional analysts. For the reasons listed 
above, we consider the presence of the Investor 
relator a positive element for a firm. Thus, those 
firms that appointed an investor relator scored a 
point. 
37. Other Committees: According to previous 
literature, internal committees in the board of 
directors can increase firm profitability. The 
literature
14
 suggests suggests that the composition 
of standing board committees is important, so this 
paper analysed whether firms appointed other 
committees or not. Those who did scored a point. 
38. A regulatory framework different from the 
national one: This provisions assumes the idea 
that a regulatory framework different from the 
national one could mine the participations of 
shareholders. This should not be intended as 
supremacy of the national framework over 
                                                                                        
evaluated by the Board of Directors at the time of his/her 
appointment. 
14 Klein (1998). 
international ones, but simply as a way to 
distinguish those firms operating under the 
national law and those who operates under 
different one. In case a firm is not operating 
under the Italian regulatory framework, it scores 
zero point instead of one. 
39. Disclosure of a corporate governance code: 
Borsa Italiana promoted the adoption of the 
corporate governance code for listed and issuing 
firms. This code, which is the base for most of 
the previous provisions, is intended to assure 
transparency in corporate governance practice 
and to safeguard shareholders minorities‘ rights. 
The appliance to the prescription of this code 
should assure a correct and safe governance, for 
this reason those firms who adopted the code 
where scored one point. 
40. Ethic code:  Literature provided several 
definition of ethics code, in agreement with Shaw 
and Barry (1995), ethics codes are one attempt to 
improve the organizational climate so that 
individuals can behave ethically. Slightly 
different is the vision of both Arrow (1974) and 
Stone (1975), they noted that ethical controls are 
necessary because the legal system and markets 
do not necessarily lead to organizational 
behaviour that takes into consideration moral 
impacts of business decisions. Thus, the founders 
try to maintain alive their ideas, so that they 
become part of the corporate culture and help 
socialize new individuals into the culture. The 
reasons listed just above highlights the 
importance for firms to adopt a code of ethics, for 
this reason, those who did scored a point. 
 
4.3. Calculating the IPOs underpricing 
 
Literature identified several methods to calculate the 
underpricing of a new issue. These indexes vary from 
a raw index of initial return to market adjusted ones. 
The easiest method to calculate underpricing is to 
adopt the following raw index  
oi
oici
i
P
PP
U
,
,, 

 
Where: 
- oiP ,  is the offering price 
- ciP ,  is the closing market price on the first day 
This index compares the closing price to the 
offer price. The result is adjusted by -1 in order to 
obtain positive value when the share realizes a 
positive return and a negative value otherwise. 
According to Ritter (2002) the opening market 
price is close to an unbiased indicator of the closing 
market price on the first day, so results are insensitive 
to whether the opening or closing market price is 
used; however, the vast majority of empirical work 
uses the first closing price to measure the first-day 
return. 
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Similarly to this index, another example of raw 
index is calculated applying a log-normal 
standardisation, and formulated as 









oi
ci
i
P
P
U
,
,
ln
 
Other authors (Cenni et al., 2001; Tykvovà and 
Walz, 2007), basing on the timing of the IPO process 
maintain that a fair indicator should consider market 
changes occurred between the day in which the 
offering price is established and the first trading day. 
For this reason, they propose to separate the 
underpricing index from a component that reflects the 
changes of the average market conditions. 
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Having 
- cI as a market index at the first trading day 
- oI as the market index at the offer time 
 
4.4. Calculating the long-run 
performance 
 
Since normative pricing models, such as the CAPM, 
have little empirical support, there is no consensus on 
how to measure long-run performance. Various 
researchers considering the same market came to 
different results, the main explanation comes from the 
variety of methods available to calculate 
underperformance to illustrate this point, consider a 
simple scenario in which a sample contains 100 firms, 
99 of which have one thousand euro market 
capitalization and one firm that has a thousand million 
euro market capitalization. Assume that the small 
firms have all underperformed by an equal percentage 
rate (50%) while the large firm has overperformed by 
50%. It is easy to see that an equal weighted measure 
of abnormal performance will indicate severe 
mispricing (50%), while value weighting will lead the 
researcher to conclude that the sample abnormal 
performance is virtually zero (Brav, Geczv and 
Gompers, 2000).
 
The most adopted, but still 
discussed, methods to calculate underperformance are 
Buy-And-Hold and Cumulative-Abnormal-Return. In 
literature, there are opposites opinions about which 
index gives a fairer vision. Barber and Lyon (1997) 
highlight how CAR technique gives a distorted view 
of long-run performance. Opposite to this, Fama 
(1998) Mitchell and Stafford (2000), Gompers and 
Lerner (2003) claim CAR superiority because they 
assert that B&H, with its product could overestimate 
the underperformance. 
To calculate CAR index one has to start from 
calculating abnormal return with the formula 
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Where  
- tiP ,  is the closing price in day t 
- tI  is the chosen market index value in day t 
Once the abnormal returns are calculated for 
every selected interval it is possible to proceed 
aggregating this data together obtaining 

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Where s  represent the number of selected 
interval and N  represent the total number of selected 
IPOs. 
Parallel to the development of CAR index, the 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) are 
calculated as the difference of corresponding 
compounded daily companies‘ and an index 
representing market conditions. In this research, the 
chosen market index is the S&P/Mib that has been 
substituted by FTSE MIB the 1
st
 June 2009. The 
choice of this index comes from its good 
representation of market conditions and data 
availability over time. 
The BHAR is defined as 
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Where 
-  tirE ,  is the expected return of shares in the t-
period. In this research, we have considered the 
S&P/MIB, which was substituted by the FTSE MIB 
- tir ,  is the return of share ‗i‘ in the t-period 
 
5. The relation between Corporate 
Governance and IPOs performance 
 
5.1. Descriptive analysis 
 
Gompers et Al. (2003) and Brown and Caylor (2004) 
in previous studies identified a positive relation 
between several measures of firm performance and 
some corporate governance indices. Gompers, Ishii 
and Metrick (2003) use Investor Responsibility 
Research Center (IRRC) data, and conclude that firms 
with fewer shareholder rights have lower firm 
valuations and lower stock returns. They classify 24 
governance factors into five groups: tactics for 
delaying hostile takeover, voting rights, 
director/officer-protection, other takeover defences, 
and state laws. According to Cremers and Nair (2003) 
G-Index is an index of anti-takeover protection rather 
than a broad index of governance because of the 
factors they consider.  Similar for certain aspect is the 
research by Brown and Caylor; they created a 
summary metric, Gov-Score, to measure the strength 
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of a firm‘s governance. In their analysis, the 
researchers computed Gov-Scores for 2,327 
individual firms using data obtained from Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS). The Gov-score is 
composed by 51 factors as either 1 or 0 depending on 
whether the firm‘s governance standards are 
minimally acceptable. Although their results are not 
completely homogeneous, they both found a positive 
relation between corporate governance and firm 
performance. 
Considering that previous literature found a 
correlation between firms‘ performance and corporate 
governance, we expect to find a similar result for the 
Italian Market. The main idea is that better 
governance leads to higher stock performance. Our 
analysis focuses on the relation between corporate 
governance and IPOs performance, which represents a 
slightly different aspect of the topic analysed in the 
literature presented above.  
From this research, in the light of the analysed 
literature, we expect to obtain a positive relation 
between the governance index and firms‘ 
performance. To test the research question, we 
analysed the IPOs issued on the Italian stock market 
in the last decade. Since the number of IPOs on the 
Italian market were not exaggerated, it has been 
possible to analyse almost all the IPOs in the selected 
period. From the panel we excluded those firms for 
which we could not find any information and 
financial firms due to their peculiar regulation, which 
may have modified the results of the research.  
The analysed panel is composed by 158 firms 
that entered in the market as follows. Figure 2 
highlights a peak of issuing firms in two periods. The 
first coincide with the new economy boom, which 
generated a high level of IPOs especially of firms 
operating in the new technologies. The second peak is 
registered in the biennium 2006-2007. The raise 
between 2006 and 2007 may be a consequence of the 
natural upturn of the market. It is followed by a 
decrease in the number of IPOs, which is mainly due 
to the recent financial crisis (2008). 
Table 1 contains a brief description of main 
firms characteristics over the sample analyzed. For 
what concern the governance indicator, the data used 
to score the firms were extrapolated from the issuing 
prospectus. To obtain additional information, where 
missing, we reviewed other documents and the bylaw. 
Although this extensive research some information, 
especially those of older IPOs, were still missing. In 
theory, the index should range from 0 to 40, as it is 
composed by forty provisions, but in the first version 
of the index, none of the firm scored less than 4 or 
more than 24. In particular, although the effort we 
spent to collect those information, 6 of the 40 
provisions included in our analysis where not 
achieved by any one of the firms included in the 
sample: we considered this characteristic has to be 
address to the difference occurring between the Italian 
legal system and corporate bylaw, and other  legal 
system considered by other researches. 
 
Table 1. Main governance characteristics over the sample analyzed 
 
Value Mean Median Dev. St. Max Min 25° Perc 75° Perc 
Governance Score 13,34 13,00 4,70 24,00 4,00 10,00 17,00 
SALES (million €) 544,56 113,93 2.159 21.956,64 1,53 34,73 247,90 
EBITDA/SALES 0,1556 0,1333 0,2928 0,9530 -2,3306 0,0980 0,2256 
Number of Board Members 7,78 7 2,74 16 3 5 9 
Number of Independent (% 
of Board Members) 
0,3397 0,3333 0,1520 0,8181 0,0000 0,2500 0,4000 
Number of No-Exec. (% of 
Board Members) 
0,5349 0,5714 0,2359 1,0000 0,0000 0,3750 0,7272 
Underpricing 0,0623 0,0211 0,2182 1,3900 -0,8985 -0,01391 0,1090 
Raw Underpricing 0,0310 0,0209 0,2921 0,8712 -2,2884 -0,0140 0,1035 
AR12 -0,1408 -0,0357 0,6260 1,7511 -2,9042 -0,3294 0,2328 
AR24 -0,2945 -0,1649 0,8860 1,5345 -4,6992 -0,6608 0,2647 
AR36 -0,5595 0,0211 0,2182 1,9008 -4,6992 -1,1869 0,1897 
CAR12 -0,0584 -0,0371 0,6835 3,4778 -2,5333 -0,2434 0,1880 
CAR24 -0,1313 -0,0167 0,7440 3,0268 -2,7122 -0,3955 -0,6153 
CAR36 -0,2136 -0,0963 0,8755 2,5862 -2,7644 -0,6153 0,3086 
BHAR12 -0,0107 -0,0876 0,4799 3,4046 -0,8879 -0,3046 0,1761 
BHAR24 -0,0348 -0,1296 0,4741 2,6749 -1,1654 -0,3266 0,1970 
BHAR36 0,0001 -0,1583 0,7014 3,0663 -2,4030 -0,3535 0,1022 
 
Furthermore, for what concern the financial 
analysis, to calculate the IPO performance we have 
used daily market data obtained from DataStream. As 
said in the previous section, the IPOs performance is 
generally associated to two different indicators, one 
for the short (underpricing) and for the long-run 
(underperformance).  
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The underpricing indicators used for the short-
term analysis are the linear one, which is indicated as 
Uderpricing, and the lognormal one, which is 
indicated as Raw Uderpricing. In Table 2 the 
undepricing phenomenon respectively occurring in 
IPOs from 1998 to 2000, from 2001 to 2005, from 
2006 to 2008 is showed. By this meaning, the analysis 
of the Italian market highlighted that the mean 
underpricing is in line with the literature background. 
This confirms that the selected market acts as the 
others market for what concern IPOs placement. 
 
 
Table 2. Underpricing phenomenon over the Italian IPOs 
 
IPOs from 1998 to 2000 
Value Mean Median Dev. St. Max Min 25° Perc 75° Perc 
Underpricing 0,1296 0,0118 0,3100 1,3900 -0,1111 -0,0435 0,1975 
Raw Underpricing 0,0952 0,0118 0,2191 0,8712 -0,1177 -0,0444 0,1802 
IPOs from 2001 to 2005  
Value Mean Median Dev. St. Max Min 25° Perc 75° Perc 
Underpricing 0,0123 0,0025 0,2365 0,5662 -0,8985 -0,0197 0,0697 
Raw Underpricing -0,0470 0,0025 0,4454 0,4486 -2,2884 -0,0199 0,0673 
IPOs from 2006 to 2008 
Value Mean Median Dev. St. Max Min 25° Perc 75° Perc 
Underpricing 0,0648 0,0520 0,1001 0,3857 -0,1333 0,0000 0,1031 
Raw Underpricing 0,0587 0,0506 0,0905 0,3262 -0,1431 0,0000 0,0981 
 
In table 3 the long run underperformance 
occurred for Italian IPOs are showed, considering the 
daily prices occurred on the markets for three timing 
interval: 12, 24 and 36 months. The results of the 
underperformance calculation, which we considered 
separately for IPOs from 1998 to 2000, from 2001 to 
2005, from 2006 to 2008, confirm the idea maintained 
by the reviewed literature: this analysis over the 
selected panel, highlighted how the selected panel 
performed less than the market on average. As the 
analysis above gave a strong support to the 
development of this research, we have matched the 
obtained results against the forty-provision corporate 
governance indicator, in order to highlight the relation 
between those two indicators. 
 
5.2. Main findings 
 
The economic literature has long defined the critical 
role that corporate governance can perform in order to 
improve the efficiency of the financial system and 
contribute to economic growth process. Consistent 
with this conceptual framework, this paper contributes 
to this investigation through the analysis of the Italian 
market. By the examination of the relation between 
CG and IPOs performance, we tried to verify the 
effectiveness as explanatory variable of a new 
governance index, along with other significant 
variables, with reference to two main areas of 
investigation related to IPOs performance, the short 
term underprincing and the long run 
underperformance. 
Regarding the first area of investigation on the 
relationship between quality of governance and short 
term underpricing, a positive relation between quality 
of governance and underpricing phenomenon was 
founded. By this meaning, even if we expected that a 
good governance could help to mitigate the 
inefficiency of capital markets, firms which are 
characterized by a good governance seem to 
performance better in terms of their first-day return, 
confirming the bandwagon hypothesis. In order to 
assess the underpricing phenomenon among the firms 
included in the sample, as well as to ensure the 
robustness of the estimation and overcome any signs 
of endogeneity, different versions of the model were 
estimated, with increasing complexity and variables, 
whose main results are shown in Table 4. In this case, 
it must be mentioned as the results presented show an 
interesting index of governance capacity to explain 
the underpricing phenomenon which characterized the 
sample of firms considered in this sample. Other 
financial characteristics, like the ratio of Ebitda to 
Sales, and the presence of no-executive board 
members, seem to increase the underpricing 
phenomenon. Otherwise, board size dimension pays a 
role in order to mitigate the underpricing, with a value 
which is significant throughout all the regressions we 
tested.  
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Table 3. Long-run performance of Italian IPOs 
 
IPOs from 1998 to 2000 
Value Mean Median Dev. St. Max Min 25° Perc 75° Perc 
AR12 -0,1979 -0,0089 0,8362 1,7511 -2,9042 -0,4529 0,2847 
AR24 -0,6200 -0,3869 1,0688 1,0237 -4,4514 -0,9905 -0,0083 
AR36 -0,9248 -0,7662 1,1587 1,2535 -4,6992 -1,4502 -0,1521 
CAR12 -0,0516 -0,0886 0,7901 2,3855 -2,5333 -0,2636 0,2294 
CAR24 -0,2041 -0,1309 0,8506 2,4984 -2,7122 -0,5133 0,2093 
CAR36 -0,3367 -0,2504 0,9420 2,4985 -2,7644 -0,6740 0,2212 
BHAR12 -0,0328 -0,1446 0,6357 3,4046 -0,8879 -0,3607 0,2040 
BHAR24 -0,1628 -0,1937 0,3484 1,0235 -0,6868 -0,3672 -0,0858 
BHAR36 -0,1503 -0,2082 0,3294 1,2635 -0,5094 -0,3587 -0,0865 
IPOs from 2001 to 2005  
Value Mean Median Dev. St. Max Min 25° Perc 75° Perc 
AR12 -0,1464 -0,0800 0,5893 0,7540 -2,1313 -0,2788 0,2141 
AR24 -0,1773 -0,0298 0,7324 1,5345 -1,9609 -0,4822 0,3017 
AR36 -0,3989 -0,2973 0,9893 1,6893 -2,5334 -1,0431 0,3032 
CAR12 -0,1119 -0,0592 0,8855 3,4778 -2,1961 -0,2483 0,1855 
CAR24 -0,0950 0,0301 0,8686 3,0268 -2,1056 -0,3366 0,2869 
CAR36 -0,1468 -0,0613 0,8881 2,5862 -2,3662 -0,5598 0,3447 
BHAR12 0,0225 -0,0594 0,3973 1,2105 -0,4958 -0,2745 0,1341 
BHAR24 0,0579 -0,0062 0,5297 1,0728 -1,1654 -0,3431 0,3615 
BHAR36 0,1030 -0,0356 0,9058 1,8651 -2,4030 -0,4270 0,5946 
IPOs from 2006 to 2008 
Value Mean Median Dev. St. Max Min 25° Perc 75° Perc 
AR12 -0,0922 -0,0336 0,4528 0,7539 -1,159 -0,280 0,2334 
AR24 -0,0955 -0,0158 0,7577 1,4330 -2,6795 -0,3985 0,3311 
AR36 0,0888 0,1574 0,9403 1,9008 -1,4094 -0,4141 0,5469 
CAR12 -0,0199 -0,0012 0,2225 0,4814 -0,4255 -0,1607 0,1123 
CAR24 -0,0748 0,0281 0,3596 0,6003 -0,9817 -0,2541 0,1085 
CAR36 0,0569 0,0663 0,4080 0,9510 -0,7116 -0,1022 0,2016 
BHAR12 -0,0160 -0,0503 0,3449 1,0826 -0,5685 -0,2145 0,1655 
BHAR24 0,0332 -0,0243 0,5262 2,6749 -0,6115 -0,2680 0,1901 
BHAR36 0,2636 -0,0252 0,9334 3,0663 -0,3655 -0,1480 0,1797 
 
 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 9, Issue 1, 2011, Continued - 6 
 
 
580 
Table 4. Regression results for underpricing phenomenon 
 
 Underpricing Raw Underpricing 
 (a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c) 
Constant 
0.423 
(-0.825) 
0.317 
(0.710) 
-0.083 
(-0.144) 
0.006 
(0.011) 
-0.209 
(-0.345) 
-0.653 
(-0.825) 
Governance Index 
0.109* 
(1.871) 
0.129** 
(2.172) 
0.304** 
(1.808) 
0.251** 
(2.479) 
0.291** 
(2.612) 
0.478** 
(2.071) 
Family 
0.019 
(0.291) 
0.044 
(0.611) 
0.066 
(0.884) 
0.091 
(1.013) 
0.138 
(1.408) 
0.157 
(1.526) 
State 
0.086 
(0.722) 
0.021 
(0.156) 
-0.091 
(-0.577) 
0.166 
(1.016) 
0.087 
(0.467) 
-0.047 
(0.217) 
Sold ≥ 20% 
0.019 
(0.276) 
0.056 
(0.712) 
0.072 
(0.901) 
0.027 
(0.277) 
0.162 
(1.437) 
-0.095 
(0.864) 
VC & PE  
0.075 
(0.977) 
0.110 
(1.333) 
0.112 
(1.324) 
0.107 
(1.020) 
0.196 
(1.599) 
0.167 
(1.441) 
Bank  
0.113 
(1.314) 
0.134 
(1.487) 
0.136 
(1.486) 
0.154 
(1.310) 
-0.034 
(-1.213) 
0.195 
(1.555) 
Ln Sales 
-0.026 
(-1.416) 
-0.028 
(-1.134) 
-0.024 
(-1.104) 
-0.032 
(-1.242) 
3.678 
(1.624) 
-0.029 
(-0.975) 
Ebitda/Sales 
0.238 
(1.550) 
0.304 
(1.661) 
0.344** 
(1.710) 
0.376** 
(1.793) 
0.422 
(1.697) 
0.519** 
(1.875) 
Ln (Board Size) 
-0.139** 
(-1.721) 
-0.209** 
(-2.077) 
-0.265** 
(-2.382) 
-0.132** 
(-1.796) 
-0.210* 
(-1.936) 
-0.271** 
(-1.775) 
Indep (% indep.)  
-0.119 
 (-0.562) 
-0.168 
 (-0.738) 
 
-0.096 
 (-0.335) 
-0.146 
(-0.467) 
No exec. (% no-exec.)  
0.305 
(1.623) 
0.411** 
(2.065) 
 
0.473 
(1.853) 
0.585** 
(2.142) 
CEO duality  
0.039 
(0.574) 
0.043 
(0.598) 
 
-0.014 
(-0.158) 
-0.012 
(-0.121) 
Nominating Committee   
-0.135 
(-1.494) 
  
-0.158 
(-1.278) 
Remuneration Committee   
-0.007 
(-0.062) 
  
-0.084 
(-0.506) 
Internal Control Committee   
-0.105 
(-0.903) 
  
-0.033 
(-0.208) 
Pre 2006   
0.041 
(0.596) 
  
0.027 
(0.287) 
Number of Observation 127 127 127 127 127 127 
Adj-R2 0.089 0.140 0.211 0.093 0.111 0.196 
 
The regression estimates the relation between underpricing phenomenon and firms‘ characteristics: in particular the results 
(coefficient) for dependent variables Underpricing and Raw Underpricing are showed (numbers in parenthesis represent the t-
Statistic value). Governance Index is the natural logarithm of Governance Score, Family is a dummy variable equal to 1 
when the majority of property owners before the quotation belong to a family, State is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the 
majority of property owners before the quotation belong to state, Sold ≥ 20% is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the 
majority owners sold more than 20% during the IPO, VC&PE is a dummy variable equal to 1 when a Venture Capitalist or 
Private Equity is present as investor before the IPO, Bank is a dummy variable equal to 1 when a bank is present as investor 
before the IPO, Ln sales is the natural logarithm of sales value, Ebitda/Sales is the ratio of Ebitda to sales, Ln (Board Size) is 
the natural logarithm of number of board members, Indep (% Indep.) is the ratio of number of Independent directors to 
number of board members, No exec. (% no-exec.) is the ratio of number of non executive directors to number of board 
members, CEO Duality is a dummy variable equal to 1 , Nominating Committee is a dummy variable equal to 1 when a 
nominating committee is present, Remuneration Committee is a dummy variable equal to 1 when a remuneration committee 
is present, Internal Control Committee is a dummy variable equal to 1 when an internal control committee is present, Pre 
2006 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the IPOs is before 2006. Alternative models have been developed to test robustness to 
different included/excluded variables. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Adj.-R2 is adjusted R-squared. 
 
Regarding the second area of investigation on 
the relationship between quality of governance and 
long run underperformance, the different performance 
achieved after the IPO deal were analyzed. Tables 5, 6 
and 7 show the relation existing between different 
long run performance, which we measured by AR, 
CAR and BHAR respectively 12, 24 and 36 months 
after the IPO. By this meaning, the analysis took 
account of the construction of several model 
assumptions so as to test the robustness of the 
variables considered most significant.  
In Table 5 the regression results for performance 
after 12 months show a positive and significant sign 
for governance index, which means that firms with a 
better governance are capable to perform better than 
others 1 year after the deal. Together with the 
governance quality, other characteristics seem to pay 
a role in order to explain better performance achieved 
by those firms: firms which are family owned perform  
better, as well as the ones where a bank is present as 
investor before the deal. Also financial characteristics 
like the increase of sales after the IPO shows a 
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positive and significant sign, whilst the natural 
logarithm of sales and the ratio of Ebitda to Sales 
show a positive sign which is significant only 
referring to Abnormal Return. Similarly to 
underpricing phenomenon, also the presence of no-
executive board members seems to influence 
positively the long run performance. 
 
 
Table 5. Regression results for performance after 12 months 
 
 AR12 CAR12 BHAR12 
 (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) 
Constant 
 
-1.511 
(-2.183) 
 
-1.667 
(0.054) 
 
-0.412 
(-0.411) 
 
-0.822 
(-0.702) 
 
0.501 
(0.975) 
 
0.286 
(0.451) 
Governance Index 
0.184** 
(2.425) 
0.126** 
(2.319) 
0.145* 
(1.794) 
0.545* 
(1.805) 
0.138** 
(2.140) 
0.020* 
(1.810) 
Family 
0.239** 
(2.107) 
0.269*** 
(2.320) 
0.290* 
(1.774) 
0.275** 
(1.683) 
0.191** 
(2.272) 
0.201** 
(2.329) 
State 
0.181 
(0.827) 
0.062 
(0.251) 
0.412 
(1.244) 
0.074 
(0.202) 
0.109 
(0.670) 
0.005 
(0.028) 
Sold ≥ 20% 
0.035 
(0.287) 
0.038 
(0.306) 
-0.161 
(-0.879) 
-0.123 
(-0.683) 
-0.029 
(-0.316) 
-0.018 
(-0.201) 
VC & PE  
0.105 
(0.801) 
0.083 
(0.633) 
0.004 
(0.023) 
-0.018 
(-0.103) 
0.036 
(0.372) 
0.028 
(0.287) 
Bank  
0.289** 
(2.067) 
0.302** 
(2.165) 
0.404** 
(1.921) 
0.401** 
(1.937) 
0.231** 
(2.225) 
0.243** 
(2.338) 
Ln Sales 
0.067** 
(2.068) 
0.066** 
(1.944) 
-0.016 
(-0.331) 
-0.019 
(-0.382) 
0.030 
(1.256) 
0.031 
(1.228) 
Δ sales (% var.) 
8.060*** 
(3.109) 
7.462*** 
(2.790) 
7.183*** 
(2.612) 
7.239*** 
(2.652) 
5.063** 
(2.631) 
5.066*** 
(2.542) 
Ebitda/Sales 
0.713*** 
(2.524) 
0.833*** 
(2.710) 
0.666 
(1.583) 
0.814 
(1.855) 
0.320 
(1.527) 
0.407* 
(1.776) 
Ln (Board Size) 
-0.190 
(-1.189) 
-0.233 
(-1.353) 
-0.107 
(-0.462) 
-0.242 
(-0.984) 
-0.183 
(-1.543) 
-0.239* 
(-1.859) 
Indep (% indep.) 
0.315 
(0.938) 
0.383 
(1.073) 
0.257 
(0.520) 
0.229 
(0.457) 
0.230 
(0.921) 
0.233 
(0.877) 
No exec. (% no-exec.) 
0.646** 
(2.171) 
0.745** 
(2.428) 
0.137 
(0.350) 
0.310 
(0.792) 
0.521** 
(2.358) 
0.624*** 
(2.694) 
CEO duality 
0.024 
(0.223) 
0.074 
(0.663) 
-0.147 
(-0.944) 
-0.146 
(-0.929) 
-0.001 
(-0.021) 
0.027 
(0.323) 
Nominating Committee  
-0.321** 
(-2.276) 
 
-0.436** 
(-2.195) 
 
-0.227** 
(-2.154) 
Remuneration Committee  
0.110 
(0.603) 
 
-0.231 
(-0.839) 
 
-0.030 
(-0.226) 
Internal Control Committee  
-0.074 
(-0.406) 
 
-0.150 
(-0.568) 
 
-0.032 
(-0.242) 
Pre 2006  
0.001 
(0.004) 
 
-0.123 
(-0.769) 
 
-0.020 
(-0.254) 
Number of Observation 128 128 128 128 128 128 
Adj-R2 0.146 0.244 0.124 0.233 0.145 0.248 
 
The regression estimates the relation between performance after 12 months and firms‘ characteristics: in particular the results 
(coefficient) for dependent variables AR12, CAR12 and BHAR12 are showed Governance Index is the natural logarithm of 
Governance Score, Family is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the majority of property owners before the quotation belong 
to a family, State is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the majority of property owners before the quotation belong to state, 
Sold ≥ 20% is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the majority owners sold more than 20% during the IPO, VC&PE is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 when a Venture Capitalist or Private Equity is present as investor before the IPO, Bank is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 when a bank is present as investor before the IPO, Ln sales is the natural logarithm of sales value, 
Δ sales (% var.) is the percentage increase of sales one year after the IPO, Ebitda/Sales is the ratio of Ebitda to sales, Ln 
(Board Size) is the natural logarithm of number of board members, Indep (% Indep.) is the ratio of number of Independent 
directors to number of board members, No exec. (% no-exec.) is the ratio of number of non executive directors to number of 
board members, CEO Duality is a dummy variable equal to 1 , Nominating Committee is a dummy variable equal to 1 when a 
nominating committee is present, Remuneration Committee is a dummy variable equal to 1 when a remuneration committee 
is present, Internal Control Committee is a dummy variable equal to 1 when an internal control committee is present, Pre 
2006 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the IPOs is before 2006. Alternative models have been developed to test robustness to 
different included/excluded variables. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Adj.-R2 is adjusted R-squared. 
 
Similarly, in Table 6 the regression results for 
performance after 24 months are showed. Also in this 
state, a positive and significant sign for governance 
index is discovered, confirming that firms with a 
better governance are capable to perform better than 
others also 2 year after the deal. Again, other 
characteristics seem to pay a role in order to explain 
better performance achieved by those firms, although 
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the results in this case are disbelieving: the family and 
bank variable continue to show a positive sign, which 
is not always significant. Also financial characteristics 
like the increase of sales after the IPO and the ratio of 
Ebitda/Sales show a positive sign, which is not 
significant referring to BHAR.  
 
Table 6. Regression results for performance after 24 months 
 
 AR24 CAR24 BHAR24 
 (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) 
Constant 
 
-1.682 
(-1.023) 
 
-0.971 
(-0.505) 
 
-1.279 
(-1.136) 
 
-1.435 
(-1.106) 
 
2.567*** 
(2.604) 
 
3.267*** 
(2.746) 
Governance Index 
0.617* 
(2.516) 
0.888** 
(2.671) 
0.003* 
(1.817) 
0.258* 
(1.963) 
0.545** 
(3.262) 
0.774** 
(2.301) 
Family 
0.262 
(1.039) 
0.310 
(1.191) 
0.422** 
(2.338) 
0.407** 
(2.256) 
0.195 
(1.286) 
0.140 
(0.877) 
State 
0.132 
(0.268) 
0.079 
(0.137) 
0.561 
(1.546) 
0.203 
(0.505) 
0.134 
(0.454) 
0.063 
(0.178) 
Sold ≥ 20% 
0.211 
(0.798) 
0.196 
(0.741) 
-0.128 
(-0.637) 
-0.105 
(-0.532) 
0.118 
(0.741) 
0.123 
(0.748) 
VC & PE  
-0.412 
(-1.404) 
-0.528* 
(-1.788) 
-0.023 
(-0.111) 
-0.055 
(-0.271) 
-0.047 
(-0.273) 
-0.057 
(-0.320) 
Bank  
0.442 
(1.468) 
0.451 
(1.495) 
0.497** 
(2.142) 
0.496** 
(2.180) 
0.282 
(1.556) 
0.289 
(1.540) 
Ln Sales 
0.111 
(1.422) 
0.080 
(1.011) 
0.018 
(0.323) 
0.013 
(0.236) 
-0.041 
(-0.882) 
-0.056 
(-1.145) 
Δ sales (% var.) 
9.817* 
(1.698) 
6.802 
(1.147) 
8.147*** 
(2.704) 
8.062*** 
(2.691) 
0.995 
(0.285) 
0.801 
(0.218) 
Ebitda/Sales 
1.901*** 
(3.102) 
1.785*** 
(2.720) 
1.258*** 
(2.747) 
1.364*** 
(2.853) 
0.486 
(1.316) 
0.564 
(1.386) 
Ln (Board Size) 
-0.178 
(-0.489) 
-0.032 
(-0.078) 
-0.002 
(-0.008) 
-0.112 
(-0.405) 
-0.007 
(-0.033) 
0.086 
(0.344) 
Indep (% indep.) 
0.748 
(0.988) 
1.274 
(1.529) 
0.288 
(0.523) 
0.347 
(0.624) 
0.500 
(1.100) 
0.690 
(1.336) 
No exec. (% no-exec.) 
0.658 
(1.009) 
0.523 
(0.769) 
0.300 
(0.694)  
0.481 
(1.114) 
0.582 
(1.484) 
0.541 
(1.282) 
CEO duality 
-0.177 
(-0.726) 
-0.157 
(-0.617) 
-0.180 
(-1.024) 
-0.154 
(-0.872) 
-0.166 
(-1.137) 
-0.092 
(-0.589) 
Nominating Committee  
-0.457 
(-1.415) 
 
-0.510** 
(-2.330) 
 
-0.192 
(-0.968) 
Remuneration Committee  
0.863** 
(1.905) 
 
-0.038 
(-0.129) 
 
0.061 
(0.221) 
Internal Control Committee  
-0.499 
(-1.180) 
 
-0.197 
(-0.689) 
 
0.069 
(0.266) 
Pre 2006  
0.053 
(0.196) 
 
-0.165 
(-0.941) 
 
-0.245 
(-1.459) 
Number of Observation 107 107 107 107 107 107 
Adj-R2 0.135 0.191 0.151 0.201 0.138 0.193 
 
The regression estimates the relation between performance after 24 months and firms‘ characteristics: in particular the results 
(coefficient) for dependent variables AR24, CAR24 and BHAR24 are showed (numbers in parenthesis represent the t-Statistic 
value). Governance Index is the natural logarithm of Governance Score, Family is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the 
majority of property owners before the quotation belong to a family, State is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the majority 
of property owners before the quotation belong to state, Sold ≥ 20% is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the majority 
owners sold more than 20% during the IPO, VC&PE is a dummy variable equal to 1 when a Venture Capitalist or Private 
Equity is present as investor before the IPO, Bank is a dummy variable equal to 1 when a bank is present as investor before 
the IPO, Ln sales is the natural logarithm of sales value, Δ sales (% var.) is the percentage increase of sales one year after the 
IPO, Ebitda/Sales is the ratio of Ebitda to sales, Ln (Board Size) is the natural logarithm of number of board members, Indep 
(% Indep.) is the ratio of number of Independent directors to number of board members, No exec. (% no-exec.) is the ratio of 
number of non executive directors to number of board members, CEO Duality is a dummy variable equal to 1 , Nominating 
Committee is a dummy variable equal to 1 when a nominating committee is present, Remuneration Committee is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 when a remuneration committee is present, Internal Control Committee is a dummy variable equal to 1 
when an internal control committee is present, Pre 2006 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the IPOs is before 2006. 
Alternative models have been developed to test robustness to different included/excluded variables. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Adj.-R2 is adjusted R-squared. 
 
Finally, in Table 7 the regression results for 
performance after 36 months are showed. Also in this 
case, a positive and significant sign for governance 
index is discovered, confirming that firms with a 
better governance are capable to perform better than 
others also 3 year after the deal. Other characteristics 
seem to pay a role in order to explain better 
performance achieved by those firms: the presence of 
a family, the presence of a bank as investor, the ratio 
of Ebitda to Sales pay a positive and significant role, 
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together with governance quality, in order to 
understand the performance achieved by the firms 
after 36 months the IPO deal. 
 
Table 7. Regression results for performance after 36 months 
 
 AR36 CAR36 BHAR36 
 (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) 
Constant 
-3.092 
(-1.218) 
-0.726 
(-0.252) 
0.107 
(0.061) 
-0.374 
(-0.192) 
1.109 
(0.720) 
2.069 
(1.112) 
Governance Index 
0.614* 
(1.765) 
 
1.548* 
(1.989) 
0.180* 
(1.872) 
0.445* 
(1.818) 
0.723** 
(2.672) 
0.763** 
(1.545) 
Family 
0.553 
(1.452) 
 
0.566 
(1.431) 
 
0.482 
(1.780) 
 
0.401 
(1.450) 
 
0.303 
(1.326) 
 
0.173 
(0.695) 
 
State 
0.572 
(0.788) 
0.376 
(0.399) 
 
0.741 
(1.355) 
 
-0.083 
(-0.124) 
 
0.155 
(0.329) 
 
-0.479 
(-0.788) 
 
Sold ≥ 20% 
0.305 
(0.740) 
0.195 
(0.463) 
-0.084 
(-0.294) 
0.025 
(0.092) 
0.542** 
(2.139) 
0.668** 
(2.586) 
VC & PE  
-0.481 
(-1.099) 
-0.625 
(-1.406) 
-0.248 
(-0.839) 
-0.338 
(-1.181) 
0.348 
(1.246) 
0.398 
(1.406) 
Bank  
0.663 
(1.460) 
0.549 
(1.179) 
0.805** 
(2.424) 
0.875*** 
(2.726) 
0.698** 
(2.410) 
0.785** 
(2.697) 
 
Ln Sales 
0.138 
(1.194) 
0.069 
(0.587) 
-0.039 
(-0.466) 
-0.053 
(-0.640) 
0.050 
(0.719) 
0.031 
(0.414) 
Δ sales (% var.) 
8.813 
(1.033) 
3.530 
(0.391) 
6.404 
(1.620) 
5.871 
(1.496) 
8.491 
(1.530) 
9.771 
(1.010) 
Ebitda/Sales 
1.941** 
(2.383) 
1.789** 
(2.047) 
1.809*** 
(3.029) 
1.881*** 
(3.046) 
0.592 
(1.118) 
0.572 
(1.010) 
Ln (Board Size) 
0.085 
(0.170) 
0.620 
(1.048) 
-0.159 
(-0.431) 
-0.342 
(-0.829) 
-0.374 
(-1.162) 
-0.366 
(-1.001) 
Indep (% indep.) 
0.897 
(0.725) 
1.919 
(1.300) 
1.052 
(1.225) 
0.841 
(0.920) 
0.156 
(0.202) 
0.048 
(0.051) 
No exec. (% no-exec.) 
1.048 
(1.068) 
0.705 
(0.670) 
0.344 
(0.593) 
0.617 
(1.070) 
1.508** 
(2.433) 
1.683** 
(2.539) 
CEO duality 
-0.451 
(-1.171) 
-0.405 
(-1.031) 
-0.338 
(-1.256) 
-0.317 
(-1.214) 
-0.118 
(-0.495) 
-0.026 
(-0.111) 
Nominating Committee  
-0.182 
(-0.350) 
 
-0.719** 
(-2.168) 
 
-0.024 
(-0.072) 
Remuneration Committee  
1.080 
(1.689) 
 
0.021 
(0.048) 
 
-0.109 
(-0.266) 
Internal Control Committee  
-0.309 
(-0.539) 
 
-0.519 
(-1.243) 
 
-0.110 
(-0.303) 
Pre 2006  
-0.379 
(-0.701) 
 
-0.114 
(-0.324) 
 
-0.569 
(-1.734) 
Number of Observation 92 92 92 92 92 92 
Adj-R2 0.142 0.201 0.198 0.241 0.129 0.189 
 
The regression estimates the relation between performance after 36 months and firms‘ characteristics: in particular the results 
(coefficient) for dependent variables AR36, CAR36 and BHAR36 are showed (numbers in parenthesis represent the t-Statistic 
value). Governance Index is the natural logarithm of Governance Score, Family is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the 
majority of property owners before the quotation belong to a family, State is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the majority 
of property owners before the quotation belong to state, Sold ≥ 20% is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the majority 
owners sold more than 20% during the IPO, VC&PE is a dummy variable equal to 1 when a Venture Capitalist or Private 
Equity is present as investor before the IPO, Bank is a dummy variable equal to 1 when a bank is present as investor before 
the IPO, Ln sales is the natural logarithm of sales value, Δ sales (% var.) is the percentage increase of sales one year after the 
IPO, Ebitda/Sales is the ratio of Ebitda to sales, Ln (Board Size) is the natural logarithm of number of board members, Indep 
(% Indep.) is the ratio of number of Independent directors to number of board members, No exec. (% no-exec.) is the ratio of 
number of non executive directors to number of board members, CEO Duality is a dummy variable equal to 1 , Nominating 
Committee is a dummy variable equal to 1 when a nominating committee is present, Remuneration Committee is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 when a remuneration committee is present, Internal Control Committee is a dummy variable equal to 1 
when an internal control committee is present, Pre 2006 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the IPOs is before 2006. 
Alternative models have been developed to test robustness to different included/excluded variables. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Adj.-R2 is adjusted R-squared. 
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Conclusions 
 
With this paper, we aimed to find a relation between 
Italian IPOs performance and corporate governance. 
The analysis was conducted over a panel of firms that 
were issued in the last decade in the Italian stock 
market. The selected panel does not include financial 
firms due to their peculiar regulation that may have 
caused distorted results. Previous literature 
emphasised the IPOs‘ well-known characteristic of 
short term underpricing and long run 
underperformance. Since the selected panel is entirely 
composed by IPOs, we decided to adopt, as 
performance proxy, both Cumulative Abnormal 
Return (CAR) and Buy-And-Hold Abnormal return 
(BHAR) indexes. The choice of these indexes fit with 
the characteristic of IPOs mentioned above, thus we 
expected to find more significant results through the 
use of this indexes rather than other indicators such as 
sales or ROE. For what concern the corporate 
governance structure, which is the other main point of 
this paper, it was evaluated through a forty-provision 
index, composed by four main areas: Board of 
Directors; Shareholders and Creditors protection; 
Remuneration schemes; Disclosure and internal 
dealing procedures. The provisions are constructed as 
Boolean questions; in case of positive compliance of a 
firm with a provision, one point is assigned to that 
firm. Thus, theoretically the score may varies from 
zero to forty (none of the firms scored more than 24 
and no less than 4). The obtained results provide a 
significant overview of the relation between CG and 
performance of IPOs, even if it could be possible to 
improve this research including an analysis of those 
firms that were excluded for the lack of information. 
Although these possible improvements this research 
highlighted the existence of a relation between CG 
and firms‘ performance. It also provided evidence that 
the Italian IPOs market behaved similarly to other 
international financial market in the last decades. The 
highlighted relation is, in fact, coherent with previous 
literature. 
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Annexes 
 
Figure 1. The number of IPOs grouped by similar underpricing. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Number of IPOs in the selected panel for each year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
